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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 05-2063, 05-2487, 05-2566 & 05-3081

EDWIN TAYLOR,
Appellant at No. 05-2566
v.
USF-RED STAR EXPRESS, INC.,
Appellant at Nos. 05-2063,
05-2487 & 05-3081

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-2216
(Honorable Clarence C. Newcomer)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 21, 2006)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
USF-Red Star, Inc. appeals the District Court’s entry of final judgment in favor of
Edwin B. Taylor in a discrimination suit brought under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101–213 (2000), as well as the denial of its post-trial motion for

judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Red Star also appeals the District Court’s
award of attorney’s fees as legally erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Taylor crossappeals the District Court’s reduction of certain hours in his attorney’s fees award as an
abuse of discretion. We will affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Red Star employed Taylor as a combination truck driver/dockworker at its
Philadelphia terminal. On March 1, 2001, Taylor was hospitalized after suffering two
seizures, possibly attributable to use of the nutritional supplement creatine, that
temporarily rendered him unconscious and unable to control himself. His treating
physician, Dr. Eduardo Enriquez, instructed him not to drive or operate hazardous
machinery. A neurologist, Dr. Karen Scardigli, on March 14, 2001, interpreted Taylor’s
MRI as consistent with a seizure disorder. Taylor returned to work and drove a forklift
on March 12, 2001, but told Red Star terminal manager Barry Saylor he was unable to
drive a truck. On March 15, 2001, Taylor informed Saylor of his seizures and, Red Star
contends, told him he had been diagnosed with “infantile epilepsy.” Saylor told Taylor
not to return to work until Red Star received information from his doctor that he could
safely operate a forklift.
Over the next eighteen months, several physicians evaluated Taylor’s condition
and ability to operate a forklift. Dr. Scardigli initially told Red Star around March 20,
2001, that Taylor could return to operating a forklift, but reversed herself on March 29,
2001, after speaking to Dr. Joel Mascaro, a physician employed by NovaCare who
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performed frequent employment physicals for Red Star. On April 25, 2001, a second
neurologist sought out by Taylor, Dr. David Roby, diagnosed Taylor as likely to remain
seizure-free and able to return to gainful employment (though not to driving a truck). On
May 7, 2001, Taylor’s family physician, Dr. Jay Glickman, also informed Red Star that
Taylor should remain seizure-free, but could not drive a truck until he remained so for a
year. On March 12, 2002, Taylor sent Red Star a February 6, 2002, letter from Dr.
Glickman stating the same, as well as a February 6, 2002, letter from a medical examiner
releasing Taylor to drive a commercial vehicle. On May 2, 2002, a NovaCare physician’s
assistant examined Taylor at Red Star’s request and issued a medical examiner’s
certificate releasing Taylor to drive a commercial vehicle, but was reversed by Dr.
Mascaro on May 6, 2002.
On July 2, 2002, Dr. Roby responded to a request for clarification by Dr. Mascaro
with a letter stating it was “possible” Taylor could return to work in some capacity in
which seizures were not an issue. Later that month, Taylor sought an evaluation from
another physician, Dr. Hillard Sharf, who wrote a letter to an EEOC investigator stating
he saw no problem in Taylor’s driving a forklift or truck. Dr. Roby, Dr. Sharf, and Dr.
Gordon Manin (Dr. Mascaro’s successor at NovaCare) agreed that Taylor should be
evaluated at Thomas Jefferson Epilepsy Center. On October 3, 2002, a neurologist there,
Dr. Michael Sperling, evaluated Taylor and concluded he was not at any substantially
greater risk of seizures than other members of the general public, and that no restrictions
should be placed on his work activities. Red Star allowed Taylor to return to work on
3

October 18, 2002. During the eighteen months in which he had not been cleared to work
by Red Star, Taylor filed a grievance with his union’s Joint Area Committee on April 2,
2001 (denied on May 8, 2001), as well as a discrimination charge against Red Star with
the EEOC on May 16, 2001. Red Star contends Taylor gave Saylor materials on
reasonable accommodations for epileptics prepared by the Epilepsy Foundation, and
falsely claimed to the EEOC that he had epilepsy. Taylor also found interim employment
driving a forklift elsewhere for several months.
Taylor sued Red Star on April 8, 2003, alleging Red Star had discriminated against
him in violation of the ADA because it regarded him as disabled. Red Star responded
that it had refused to allow Taylor to work not because it regarded him as disabled, but
because doctors had not cleared him to return to work. Both Red Star and Taylor filed
motions for summary judgment that the District Court denied. The case was tried to a
jury, which found Taylor proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Red Star
regarded him as disabled, that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his
job with or without accommodation, and that he had been discriminated against by Red
Star because it regarded him as disabled. The jury also found Red Star had failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor had misinformed Red Star about his
medical condition. It awarded Taylor a total of $158,796.34 in back pay, lost pension
benefits, and compensatory damages. The District Court entered a final judgment in
Taylor’s favor on October 13, 2004. On October 26, 2004, Taylor’s counsel filed a
motion for $367,388.15 in attorney’s fees under the ADA. The next day, Red Star moved
4

for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial, contending there had
been errors in the jury charge. On March 9, 2005, the District Court denied Red Star’s
post-judgment motion and granted Taylor’s counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees in part.
It later also granted Taylor’s counsel’s supplemental motion for attorney’s fees on June 8,
2005, so that Taylor was awarded a total of roughly $290,000 in attorney’s fees.
II. Red Star’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or a New Trial
Red Star appeals the District Court’s entry of final judgment, as well as its denial
of a motion for a new trial on the basis of prejudicial errors in the jury charge. We review
the denial of a new trial motion for abuse of discretion. Honeywell, Inc. v. Am. Standards
Testing Bureau, Inc., 851 F.2d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 1988). Where, as here, a party properly
objects to a jury instruction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, we exercise plenary review to
determine whether the instruction misstated the applicable law. Franklin Prescriptions,
Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2005). We generally review jury
instructions for abuse of discretion to determine whether they are misleading or
inadequate. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 929 (3d Cir. 1997).
The District Court instructed the jury: “you need not decide whether USF-Red Star
prevented Mr. Taylor from returning to work because of his medical condition. There is
no dispute as to this fact.” (J.A. 1412.) Red Star contends this instruction was plainly
false, gravely prejudiced Red Star’s defense that it refused to allow Taylor to return to
work because no physician had cleared him to drive a forklift (rather than because of his
medical condition), and bolstered Taylor’s case and credibility. In denying Red Star’s
5

objection to the instruction, the District Court noted: “Well, it’s really a sequence of
things, isn’t it? Because of [Taylor’s] seizures, the doctors gave certain opinions, et
cetera, but it was basically because he had seizures that he was precluded from going to
work. . . . [F]undamentally, initially, it was because he had seizures that he was sent
home.” (J.A. 1252–54.) Moreover, Saylor testified that, on initially sending Taylor
home, he told him:
[D]riving a forklift seems to me places yourself and some other employees
in just as much danger as driving a truck might . . . . [U]ntil we get further
information from your treating physician with them telling us it’s a good
idea for you to be doing this or medically possible for you to be doing this .
. . we [will] not be calling [you] for work.
(J.A. 823.) We conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the
jury as it did, and that the instruction was not misleading or inadequate.1
The District Court also instructed the jury on the meaning of “major life activity”
under the ADA:

1

The recent Eighth Circuit decision cited by Red Star’s counsel in his November 14,
2006, letter to the Court is distinguishable. The defendant employer in Pittari v.
American Eagle Airlines, Inc., Nos. 05-4181 & 06-2287, 2006 WL 3230089 (8th Cir.
Nov. 9, 2006), placed narrow, temporary restrictions on the plaintiff employee’s work
only after receiving a medical diagnosis (with which the employee initially agreed) that
the employee’s cognitive faculties might impair his ability to perform certain safetysensitive duties. Here, by contrast, there was evidence Red Star (through Saylor)
discovered Taylor had suffered seizures and then sua sponte prevented him from working
at all until a medical diagnosis could clear him to do so. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit
held that, because the employee had only presented evidence showing he was disqualified
from a narrow range of jobs, as opposed to the major life activity of working, the
employer was entitled to summary judgment on the employee’s ADA claim. Id. at *6.
Here, by contrast, there was evidence Red Star saw Taylor as disqualified from a broad
range of work, and the jury found Red Star regarded him as disabled.
6

[T]he phrase “major life activity” means an activity that an average person
can perform with little or no difficulty. Examples are caring for oneself,
walking, breathing, seeing, hearing, and working. Mr. Taylor claims that
USF-Red Star perceived him as having epilepsy or a seizure disorder, which
substantially limited his major life activities of walking, breathing, caring
for himself, remaining conscious and/or working and that it so classified
him without a factual foundation.
Now merely driving a forklift or truck is not a major life activity. To
find that USF-Red Star regarded Mr. Taylor as having an impairment,
which substantially limited [his] major life activity of working, plaintiff
must prove that USF-Red Star believed that Mr. Taylor had an impairment
which restricted his ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range
of jobs in various classes, as compared to the average person, having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform one type
of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of one’s choice, does not
necessarily mean that one is substantially limited in the major life activity
of working.
(J.A. 1416–17.) Quoting only the first sentence of this instruction, Red Star contends it
was “‘legally erroneous’” and “plainly did not ‘fairly and adequately’ submit the issues to
the jury.” (Red Star Br. 29.) Both at trial and in its brief, Red Star contended the District
Court should have instructed the jury that a “major life activity” is an activity “of central
importance to daily life” (Red Star Br. 28–29; J.A. 1269–70), relying on Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
Toyota dealt with the “major life activity of performing manual tasks,” which it
found “different” from the major life activity of working. 534 U.S. at 200. In Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999), the Court assumed without deciding that
working was a major life activity under the ADA, and found that a showing of being
“substantially limited” in the major life activity of working under the ADA “requires, at a
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minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs.” It noted
this was consistent with ADA regulations promulgated by the EEOC, which state:
With respect to the major life activity of working . . . [t]he term
substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared
to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2005). As the District Court noted in its order denying Red
Star’s new trial motion, this Court has also followed Sutton in applying the “class”
approach to the major life activity of working. See Edwin Taylor v. USF-Red Star
Express, Inc., No. 03-2216, at 6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005) (citing Tice v. Centre Area
Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 2001)). And in Toyota, the Court cited both
Sutton and the EEOC regulations in noting the “class” approach still applied to
determining whether an individual was substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, though not the major life activity of performing manual tasks. 534 U.S. at 200.
We conclude there was no error in the District Court’s instruction on the meaning of
“major life activity,” which was consistent with Toyota, Sutton, our precedent, and the
EEOC regulations.
Red Star also appeals the District Court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a
matter of law, on grounds Taylor presented no evidence for any reasonable juror to find
that Red Star regarded Taylor as “disabled,” and that, even if a reasonable juror could
have found Red Star regarded Taylor as disabled, a plaintiff cannot recover on a
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“regarded as” disability theory when he unreasonably fails to correct the defendant’s
mistaken perception of his impairment. We will affirm the denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law “unless the record is ‘critically deficient of that minimum
quantity of evidence from which the jury might reasonably afford relief,’” and regard the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Honeywell, 851 F.2d at
654–55 (quoting Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir.
1986)).
Red Star contends no reasonable jury could have found Red Star regarded Taylor
as “disabled,” because Taylor presented no evidence regarding Red Star’s perception of
the frequency or severity of the seizures Taylor suffered, and no evidence Red Star
believed Taylor’s seizures prevented him from doing anything other than driving a truck
or forklift. In fact, the trial record contains evidence Red Star believed Taylor was
“seizure prone” so that he “might have another seizure and be a danger to the public”
(J.A. 883), and that “no matter what he was doing [he] could be a threat to himself [and]
others” (J.A. 332). An email discussing Red Star’s possible response to complaints by
Taylor’s union also reflects this perception:
We need to disclaim Local 107’s claim that we have enough “floor”
work to have kept Mr. Taylor supplied with work. This is a [sic] simply
untrue. You can’t work our dock in [Philadelphia] or anywhere without the
need to operate a forklift being prevalent through 75 to 90 percent of your
time.
. . . Since just walking a dock requires careful awareness of
everything around you, suppose a seizure would occur and the afflicted
person falls into the path of a forklift. The person risks serious injury or
death. Suppose the seizure prone person is walking into a trailer or is near
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the edge of the dock for other reasons. Suppose a seizure occurs and the
person falls from the dock to the pavement . . . below?
(J.A. 1669.)2 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, we conclude a
jury could reasonably have found Red Star regarded him as “disabled,” and accordingly
that the District Court did not err in denying Red Star’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law on that ground.
Red Star contends that even if a reasonable jury could have found Red Star
regarded Taylor as disabled, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Taylor
caused and fostered any mistaken impression that Red Star had concerning his condition.
In Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999), we found an employer
could be held liable for regarding an employee as disabled even when that perception was
mistaken, but that a “reasonable mistake” defense was sometimes available when the
employee was responsible for the mistaken perception. Specifically, we stated:
If an employer regards a plaintiff as disabled based on a mistake in an
individualized determination of the employee’s actual condition rather than
on a belief about the effects of the kind of impairment the employer
regarded the employee as having, then the employer will have a defense if
the employee unreasonably failed to inform the employer of the actual
situation.

2

As the District Court noted, Red Star’s own motion for judgment as a matter of law
stated Taylor had suffered seizures that prevented him from walking or talking. Edwin
Taylor v. USF-Red Star Express, Inc., No. 03-2216, at 6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005) (order
denying Red Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new
trial). The motion also stated if Taylor suffered another seizure “while working on the
dock” he could fall into the path of another forklift. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s
Post-Trial Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial at 21,
Taylor, No. 03-2216 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2004).
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Id. at 193 (emphasis added). Red Star contends it made decisions based on an
individualized determination of Taylor’s condition, and that Taylor knowingly misled
Red Star into regarding him as having epilepsy.3
But there was evidence Red Star’s perception that Taylor had a serious epileptic
condition preventing him from working in any capacity on Red Star’s dock was not based
on information from Taylor, but on the assessments of doctors reporting to Red Star. For
example, Dr. Mascaro testified he was concerned at least as early as March 26, 2001, that
Taylor was unable to operate a motor vehicle due to a seizure disorder, and, upon seeing
Dr. Scardigli’s late March 2001 opinion that Taylor was capable of operating a forklift,
that he called Dr. Scardigli “about the potential danger of someone with epilepsy
operating a motorized vehicle.” (J.A. 481–82.)
As the District Court noted in denying Red Star’s motion for judgment as a matter
of law, “[t]here was conflicting evidence on this issue, and the Jury clearly resolved it in
favor of [Taylor]. In keeping with Supreme Court precedent, this Court is obligated to
respect the Jury’s conclusion.” Taylor, No. 03-2216, at 7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005) (order
denying Red Star’s post-trial motions) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

3

Specifically, Red Star contends Taylor: told Saylor he had been diagnosed with
infantile epilepsy and provided Red Star with literature on accommodations for epilepsy;
signed an EEOC discrimination charge in which he falsely stated he had been diagnosed
with epilepsy and Red Star had discriminated against him for that reason; wrote a letter to
Red Star requesting accommodation for epilepsy on May 17, 2001; and testified he never
believed he had epilepsy. (Red Star Br. 8, 38.)
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Taylor, we conclude a jury could reasonably have found Red Star’s perception of Taylor
as disabled was not a result of Taylor’s unreasonably failing to inform Red Star of his
condition, and accordingly that the District Court did not err in denying Red Star’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on that ground.
III. The District Court’s Awards of Attorney’s Fees
The District Court awarded Taylor’s counsel a total of roughly $290,000 in
attorney’s fees under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, for approximately 1242 hours of work
(roughly $246,000 in response to the initial motion for attorney’s fees and roughly
$44,000 in response to his supplemental motion for attorney’s fees). In making the
awards, the court noted “[t]he underlying litigation was extremely hard-fought and
contentious, mostly due to [Red Star’s] apparent strategy of fighting [Taylor] at every
turn, through the extensive pre-trial motions practice to post-trial motions.” Taylor, No.
03-2216, at 1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005) (order granting in part Taylor’s initial motion for
attorney’s fees). Red Star appeals both the District Court’s initial and supplemental
awards of attorney’s fees, while Taylor’s counsel appeals the District Court’s reduction of
the initial award. We will affirm both awards.
A. Procedural History
The initial motion for attorney’s fees sought roughly $367,000. Red Star
responded to the motion, contending the fee request was excessive and that the District
Court should reduce any fee award to a figure below $100,000. Red Star listed several
“specific objections” to the hours for which Taylor sought compensation, contending they
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were excessive and unnecessary: it contended 241.7 hours supposedly expended on
preparation of Taylor’s ultimately unsuccessful summary judgment motion were
excessive in a single-plaintiff case given counsel’s expertise; and it contended 59 hours
supposedly expended on preparation of jury instructions were excessive given the time
that had already been expended in the case.
In its initial fee award of March 8, 2005, the District Court made three reductions
to the hours presented in Taylor’s initial motion for attorney’s fees (3.5 hours for recordkeeping irregularities and 44 hours of a senior attorney’s trial time, because his presence
had been unnecessary and redundant). It also provisionally withheld fees for the hours
Taylor contended had been spent preparing his summary judgment motion and jury
instructions. As to the 241.7 summary judgment motion hours, the District Court stated:
“the amount of time billed for [the motion] is simply astounding (particularly in light of
its ultimate failure) and therefore not completely reasonable.” Taylor, No. 03-2216, at
9–10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2005) (order granting in part Taylor’s initial motion for attorney’s
fees). As to the 59 jury instruction hours, it stated: “this smacks of excessiveness.” Id. at
11. For both figures, however, the court stated it could not “unilaterally, and without
sufficient evidence, dictate the number of hours that would have been reasonable.” Id. at
10. It stated Red Star had “submitted no contrary information, criticizing counsel’s
utilization of time as broadly unreasonable, excessive, and redundant,” and directed Red
Star (and allowed Taylor) to submit additional evidence as to the hours that would have
been reasonable. Id. at 4, 10–11. If Red Star failed to submit such evidence, the court
13

stated, it would consider Red Star to have constructively waived its objections to the
summary judgment and jury instruction hours.
But Red Star declined to provide the evidence requested by the District Court. In a
March 22, 2005, supplemental brief, it contended the initial attorney’s fees order had
found Taylor had failed to show that the hours he claimed were expended on his summary
judgment motion and jury instructions were reasonable. In directing Red Star to submit
evidence on reasonableness, Red Star contended, the District Court had improperly
shifted the burden of showing reasonableness from the fee applicant to the adverse party.
It contended the specific objections in its November 9, 2004, response were sufficient to
allow the District Court to reduce the hours for which Taylor’s counsel were entitled to
fees. Taylor’s counsel, meanwhile, filed a supplemental affidavit on March 22, 2005,
stating the hours expended in preparing the summary judgment motion and jury
instructions were reasonable.
In an order of April 26, 2005, the District Court awarded Taylor attorney’s fees for
the 59 hours spent by his counsel preparing jury instructions (finding Taylor’s attorney’s
contention in her supplemental affidavit that this amounted only to a week of time
persuasive), but reduced the hours spent on the summary judgment motion for which it
awarded fees from 241.7 to 41.32 (awarding fees only for the hours expended on the
summary judgment brief’s factual statement, because Taylor’s bills were otherwise
insufficiently detailed to separate time spent on individual arguments within the brief). In
response to Red Star’s brief, the court characterized its earlier order as not concluding
14

that the hours submitted by Taylor for preparation of the summary judgment motion and
jury instructions were unreasonable, but merely suspecting that they might be
unreasonable. It stated it had invited Red Star to submit evidence “to lend credence to
[Red Star’s] opinion, and the Court’s suspicion, that certain of [Taylor’s] hours were
excessive and redundant.” Taylor, No. 03-2216, at 1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2005) (order
directing Red Star to remit fees to Taylor). The court stated it had not shifted the burden
of proof from Taylor to Red Star:
Quite the contrary, the Court suggested that the amount of hours spent on
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and on Plaintiff’s jury
instructions, may have been unreasonable, and that the Court could not
unilaterally ascribe an amount of hours that would have been reasonable
given the record before it at that time. Although it may, in hindsight, have
been appropriate to require, rather than suggest, that Plaintiff submit
additional authority in order to prevail, Plaintiff has submitted exactly the
kind of authority that the Court contemplated, rendering Defendant’s
concern moot.
Id. at 1 n.1. But the District Court’s decision not to reduce the jury instruction hours
seemingly relied in part on Red Star’s failure to submit any evidence in response to the
court’s earlier order. See id. at 3 (“This conclusion is bolstered by Defense Counsel’s
unwillingness to submit any evidence supporting their contention that Plaintiff’s Counsel
spent an unreasonable amount of time preparing their jury charge.”).
On April 20, 2005, while his initial motion for attorney’s fees was still pending,
Taylor’s counsel filed a supplemental motion for attorney’s fees, seeking $43,591.50 for
149.2 hours spent on post-trial motions and preparation of the initial motion for attorney’s
fees. On May 20, 2005, Red Star responded to Taylor’s motion, contending it was both
15

untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) (because filed more than fourteen days after
any entry of judgment) and unreasonable. On May 26, 2005, Taylor’s counsel contended
the supplemental motion was not untimely, because they had reasonably waited until they
had finished responding to Red Star’s oppositional responses to the initial motion for
attorney’s fees before filing it. On June 8, 2005, the District Court granted Taylor’s
supplemental motion for fees, rejecting Red Star’s timeliness argument:
[Red Star’s] objections to the timeliness of [Taylor’s] submission are
groundless, given the completely logical timetable in which [Taylor’s
counsel] submitted their fee requests. How could [Taylor’s counsel] submit
a bill for the time spent preparing his fee petition before [they] completed
its preparation and found out that it had been granted? [Red Star’s]
suggestion that this would somehow be appropriate does not comport with
common sense. Although the Court may not have literally ordered the
briefing schedule for the fees litigation, the Court is quite comfortable with
the notion that such a briefing schedule was implied.
Taylor, No. 03-2216, at 1 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005).
B. Discussion
We review the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of
discretion. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). We can find an
abuse of discretion if no reasonable person would adopt the District Court’s view.
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1982). Whether the District Court applied
the proper standards or procedures is a question of law subject to plenary review. Rode,
892 F.2d at 1182.
Red Star contends the District Court erred as a matter of law in directing Red Star
to submit evidence on the number of hours that would have been reasonable for Taylor’s
16

counsel to expend in preparing the summary judgment motion and jury instructions, after
it had already found that Taylor’s counsel had failed to prove the hours were reasonable.
Our precedent on the calculation of an award of attorney’s fees and appellate review is
well settled: the party seeking attorney’s fees has the ultimate burden to prove that the
hours for which it seeks fees were reasonably expended, and hours are not reasonably
expended if they are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. First, the petitioner
must meet an initial burden by “‘submit[ting] evidence supporting the hours worked and
rates claimed.’” Id. at 1183 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
“In a statutory fee case, the party opposing the fee award then has the burden to
challenge, by affidavit or brief with sufficient specificity to give fee applicants notice, the
reasonableness of the requested fee.” Id. (citing Bell v. Utd. Princeton Props., Inc., 884
F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1989)). Once the adverse party raises sufficiently specific objections to
the fee request, a district court “has a great deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in
light of those objections.” Id. at 1183 (citing Bell, 884 F.2d at 721). But a district court
may not make sua sponte reductions to fee requests based on material facts not raised at
all by the adverse party, because that would deprive the fee petitioner of notice of the
need to offer evidence of reasonableness and because statutory fee litigation is
adversarial. Bell, 884 F.2d at 720, 719; United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203,
212 (3d Cir. 2000). In Bell, we stated “that the adverse party’s submissions cannot
merely allege in general terms that the time spent was excessive,” but must identify both
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the general type of work being challenged and the specific grounds for contending that
the hours were unreasonable. 884 F.2d at 720.
The District Court’s language in the present case suggests that it did not believe
Taylor’s counsel had met their initial burden of showing the hours spent on his summary
judgment motion and jury instructions were reasonable. So, it may have committed an
error of law in continuing to consider awarding fees to Taylor for hours that had not been
shown to be reasonable. It also appears that the objections to the summary judgment and
jury instructions hours made by Red Star were sufficiently specific to allow the District
Court to reduce those hours, as they met Bell’s two requirements and appeared sufficient
to put Taylor on notice. Accordingly, it may have been legal error for the District Court
to ask Red Star to submit additional information on those hours on the “suspicion” they
were unreasonable.4
But even assuming arguendo that the District Court erred as a matter of law in
applying the wrong standard to determine whether the hours submitted by Taylor for
preparation of his summary judgment motion and jury instructions were reasonable, we
conclude the error was harmless. See Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir.
2005) (“An error will be deemed harmless only if it is ‘highly probable’ that the error did

4

Cf. Loughner v. University of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding
error in district court’s failure to consider defendants’ substantive objections to plaintiff’s
fee petition in determining the reasonableness of hours and subsequent acceptance as
reasonable of all the hours submitted by plaintiff “based on Defendants’ failure to even
attempt to estimate the number of hours and costs expended in defending this action”).
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not affect the outcome of the case.” ).5 As our precedents indicate, district courts have a
great deal of discretion in making attorney’s fee awards once the petitioner has satisfied
the initial reasonableness burden and the adverse party has presented objections. And
here the District Court did not rely on Red Star’s failure to present further objections and
award Taylor the full amount of fees he sought, but rather reduced the hours expended on
summary judgment and jury instructions for which it awarded fees, from 300.7 to 100.32.
It is highly probable that the same outcome would have resulted had the District Court
simply ruled that Red Star’s objections had put Taylor on notice of the need to defend the
reasonableness of the hours in question. See Taylor, No. 03-2216, at 1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
26, 2005) (order directing Red Star to remit fees to Taylor) (“Although it may, in
hindsight, have been appropriate to require, rather than suggest, that Plaintiff submit
additional authority in order to prevail, Plaintiff has submitted exactly the kind of
authority that the Court contemplated, rendering Defendant’s concern moot.”). We
conclude any legal error was harmless.
Red Star contends the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting Taylor’s
supplemental motion for attorney’s fees, because it was filed more than fourteen days

5

We have previously applied the “harmless error” rule to awards of attorney’s fees.
See, e.g., Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Cannon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 234–35
(3d Cir. 1998); Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 253, 260–61 (3d
Cir. 1995); Davis v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 924 F.2d 51, 55–56 (3d Cir. 1991); Francois
v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979).
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after any final judgment, in contravention of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B).6 The 1993
Amendments to that rule stated: “What is required is the filing of a motion sufficient to
alert the adversary and the court that there is a claim for fees, and the amount of such fees
. . . .” Notice is a greater concern in initial motions for attorney’s fees than it is in
supplemental motions, and courts considering the timeliness of supplemental motions
have allowed those motions to be filed as long as their timing was reasonable. See, e.g.,
Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 866, 868 (D.
Or. 1998) (finding plaintiff’s motion for supplemental attorney’s fees was timely, despite
being filed more than fourteen days after the entry of judgment, because it was “filed
within a reasonable time after the amount of fees incurred was known”); Parker v.
Califano, 443 F. Supp. 789, 792 (D.D.C. 1978) (“[C]ounsel’s decision not to file any
supplemental fees motions until the case was completed in its entirety was perfectly
reasonable.”); see also Bernback v. Greco, No. 98-0230, 2005 WL 1563503, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. June 30, 2005) (granting plaintiff leave to file a supplemental motion for postjudgment fees and negating defendant’s contention that the supplemental motion was
untimely).7 We conclude the District Court did not err as a matter of law in granting

6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 is not jurisdictional. Mints v. Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253,
1260 (3d Cir. 1996).
7

In contrast, courts in this Circuit have denied initial motions for attorney’s fees filed
more than fourteen days after the entry of judgment. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lancaster
Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 642 n.12 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting, in upholding denial of initial
motion for attorney’s fees, that it “was not timely under Fed R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)
because it was not filed and served within 14 days after entry of judgment”); Berwyn
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Taylor’s supplemental motion for attorney’s fees because its timing was logical, despite
the fact that it was filed more than fourteen days after any entry of judgment.
Both Red Star and Taylor contend the District Court abused its discretion in its
awards of attorney’s fees.8 Red Star contends the District Court abused its discretion by
failing to eliminate unnecessary and duplicative hours from Taylor’s initial motion for
fees and his supplemental motion for fees. And Taylor contends the District Court
abused its discretion in reducing the hours expended on preparing Taylor’s summary
judgment motion for which it awarded fees from 241.7 to 41.32. In awarding fees, a
district court “must make an adequate record upon which we can review its decisions.”
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1187. Here, the District Court based its fee awards on extensive billing
records and exhibits, sought additional briefing to determine the reasonableness of certain

Capital Invs., Inc. v. Shore Venture Group, LLC, No. 01-0691, 2006 WL 2045700, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2006) (finding plaintiff’s initial motion for attorney’s fees untimely
because filed more than fourteen days after the entry of judgment, and noting that,
“[w]hile it is probable that this court would have discretion to grant even an untimely
motion for counsel fees, the circumstances of this case do not warrant such an exercise of
discretion”).
8

The District Court awarded Taylor roughly $290,000 in attorney’s fees, while his
total recovery was roughly $158,000. But, as the District Court noted, this litigation has
been quite contentious and time-consuming. And we have expressed “serious concerns
with the practice of limiting an award of attorney’s fees to maintain proportionality
between the fees and the amount of damages awarded.” Washington v. Philadelphia Cty.
Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1039 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing N.E. Women’s Ctr. v.
McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 474–75 (3d Cir. 1989); Cunningham v. City of McKeesport,
807 F.2d 49, 52–54 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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hours, and cogently explained its reasoning in making reductions. We find the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in making its awards of attorney’s fees.
IV.
We will affirm the District Court’s entry of final judgment, its denial of the postjudgment motion, and its attorney’s fees awards.
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